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Abstract: This paper forms part of the Northern/Ireland Feminist Judgments Project. It 
comes in two parts: a feminist judgment and an accompanying commentary. The purpose of a 
Feminist Judgments Project is to rewrite the “missing” feminist judgments in significant legal 
cases. A driver of the methodology is to put feminist theory and critique into action, and to 
show how cases could have been reasoned and/or decided differently. The case in this chapter 
is a clinical negligence claim against a fertility clinic, which carelessly used the wrong donor 
sperm in a woman’s IVF treatment (A and B (by C, their mother and next friend) v A (Health and 
Social Services Trust) [2011] NICA 28). The consequences of this mistake were that the children 
born from the fertility treatment had different skin colour to the woman and her husband, as 
well as each other. The claim was from the children, as the clinic settled out-of-court with the 
parents. Julie McCandless’ feminist judgment deploys very different reasoning to the original 
court decisions, and in part reaches a different conclusion. Marian Duggan’s commentary 
explains and problematizes the approach of the feminist judgment, as well as putting the 
broader identity issues signalled by the case in context.  
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Background to feminist judging and further details of the Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments Project: 
 
The Women’s Court of Canada (www.womenscourt.ca/ca) and the English Feminist 
Judgments Project (https://www.kent.ac.uk/law/fjp/) inaugurated a critical legal methodology 
which re-calibrated the internal mechanics of judicial reasoning in order to demonstrate how 
feminist perspectives can bring new insights to judgment making. The feminist judgment 
method may take a number of guises. For example, it can challenge distinctions between 
‘public’ and ‘private’, retell the facts of the case to make women’s lived experiences more 
visible, or incorporate insights from feminist empirical studies (see further: Rosemary Hunter, 
Claire McGlynn, Erika Rackley (eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2010), ch 2). The success of these projects has inspired sister Feminist Judgments 
Projects in other common law jurisdictions such as Australia, the USA, New 
Zealand/Aotearoa and in International law. Other critical perspectives have also adapted the 
methodology, with projects pertaining to environmental and ethical concerns. 
 
The Northern/Ireland Feminist Judgments Project adapts the feminist judging methodology to 
inaugurate a fresh dialogue on gender, judicial power and national identity within Ireland and 
Northern Ireland. The Project has involved over 100 academics, practitioners, activists, 
litigants, students, artists and poets who have worked collaboratively to re-write 27 legal cases 
from Ireland and Northern Ireland. These cases cover a broad range of substantive legal areas 
– constitutional, contract, human rights, property, international, children, medical, 
employment, discrimination, family, animal, tort, criminal, equity – as well as type of court case 
– from the Northern Ireland County Court to the Irish Supreme Court. By framing judgment 
as an inherently political activity, the Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments Project has taken the 
methodology in challenging new directions. Judges play different roles according to their 
political environment. Ireland and Northern Ireland are separate jurisdictions with difficult and 
overlapping legal and political histories. Over the past century, both legal orders have been 
subject to considerable contestation, in which judges have been crucial, if not always nakedly, 
political figures as legal judgments have articulated ideal national futures. Through the 
rewritten judgments, the Northern/Ireland Feminist Judgments Project has delineated and 
challenged the gendered politics of identity in legal decision-making. The rewritten cases, along 
with a number of framing chapters, will be published in an anthology by Hart in 2016: 
Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments: Judges’ Troubles and the Gendered Politics of Identity. 
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COMMENTARY ON 
A AND B (BY C) v A (HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES TRUST) 
 
By MARIAN DUGGAN 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This case involves twins, who were born via IVF treatment using donor sperm in 
Northern Ireland. Their mother and father had requested sperm from a 
‘Caucasian’ donor to ensure any resultant children would appear as racially 
‘matched’. The clinic’s oversight meant that sperm was administered from a 
‘Caucasian (Cape Coloured)’ donor, thus South African in origin with a 
background comprising of white, black and Malay heritage.1  The children were 
born with a different and darker skin colour from their parents and different skin 
colour from each other. The basis of the children’s legal claim was that while 
growing up in Northern Ireland they had been subjected to ‘abusive and 
derogatory comment’ about their skin colour and their mother’s implied infidelity. 
This had led them to question their relationship to their parents and each other, 
causing emotional upset. The children also expressed concerns over their future 
prospects as a result of the racial hostility to which they were exposed.2  
This case may seem like an odd selection for a feminist judgment as it does 
not obviously raise issues of gendered harm, stereotypes or injustice that feminist 
analyses of tort law have traditionally focussed.3  It is also a troubling case for 
feminist analysis as underpinning the children’s complaint is the assumption that 
they were entitled to inherit and benefit from their parents’ Whiteness,4 raising 
important questions pertaining to power and privilege associated with the 
intersection of perceived racial characteristics and family structure. Such 
assumptions tend to be ripe for feminist and critical race theory critique,5 
prompting the dilemma of how best to respond to the distress and disadvantage 
experienced as a result of such disruptions. In her feminist judgment Julie 
McCandless is explicit about her discomfort with the children’s claim. However, 
by foregrounding the children’s concerns and experiences she delivers a judgment 
                                                     
1 For a history of the term ‘Caucasian’ and its problematic associations with Whiteness, see: Nell Irvin 
Painter, The History of White People (New York, W.W. Norton and Company Inc, 2010, reprint edition), 72-
90. 
2 The case was heard at the High Court and the Court of Appeal, with Gillen J and Girvan LJ delivering 
judgment in A and B (by C, their mother and next friend) v A (Health and Social Services Trust) [2010] NIQB 108 
and A and B (by C, their mother and next friend) v A (Health and Social Services Trust) [2011] NICA 28 
respectively. Morgan LCJ and Sir John Sheil sat with Girvan LJ, but as per the vast majority of Northern 
Ireland Court of Appeal decisions, no concurring or dissenting judgments were delivered and the 
presiding judge delivered the ‘one voice’ judgment of the court. The feminist judgment is a replacement 
Court of Appeal decision. 
3 Janice Richardson and Erika Rackley (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Tort Law (Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge, 
2012). 
4 Ruth Frankenberg, The Social Construction of Whiteness: White Women, Race Matters (USA: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993). 
5 Patricia Hill Collins, ‘It’s All in the Family: Intersections of Gender, Race and Nation’ (1998) Hypatia 
13(3), 62-82. Indeed, a recent legal case in Ohio involving a white lesbian couple and the mistaken use of 
sperm from a black, rather than a white, donor has been heavily criticised by eminent critical race 
theorist, Patricia Collins, who framed the case as a ‘wrongful birth’ action against a ‘black child’. Available 
at:  http://www.thenation.com/article/value-whiteness/ (accessed 25August 2015). 
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that tackles, rather than overlooks, the culturally specific factors of racism and 
identity in Northern Ireland. In doing so, she challenges the ‘colour blind’6 
approach in the original judgments, as well as the judicial individualisation of 
racism in Northern Ireland to a ‘misguided’7 and ‘boorish’8 minority. While 
perhaps not asking the ‘woman question’9  this feminist judgment asks the ‘power 
question’ in an attempt to rectify the judicial silence in the original judgment on 
the complexities and operation of racism and structural inequality in society. 
 
UNPACKING RACISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
‘Race’ is a socially constructed concept which has – and continues – to underpin 
significant levels of material persecution based on (mis)interpretations of lesser 
worth, citizenship and ability.10  This case poses uncomfortable questions which 
both illustrate and engage with issues of race and racism in Northern Irish society, 
as well as the law’s limited role in ameliorating the effects of racism. The children’s 
alleged emotional upset was caused by comments illustrating the differences in the 
family’s skin colour; whilst distressing, this does not ordinarily constitute ‘harm’ in 
a legally actionable sense, regardless as to the past, present and perceived potential 
impact on the applicant. In his original judgment, Gillen J rejected the children’s 
argument that the clinic owed them a duty of care, and reasoned that if he was 
wrong on this point, the children had been born ‘normal and healthy’ and 
therefore had not suffered any legally recognisable harm. He ventured that to 
compensate them financially would be to allow the children to grow up believing 
that their skin colour meant that they were somehow inherently ‘damaged’.11   
Gillen J therefore does not find the clinic at ‘fault’ for the children’s 
emotional distress; yet it was the clinic’s error that resulted in the children being 
exposed to repeated racist victimisation from individuals that caused concern for 
                                                     
6 The literature on ‘colour blindness’ relates predominantly to the US (see for example: Michael Brown, 
Martin Carnoy, Elliott Currie, Troy Duster, David Oppenheimer, Marjorie Shultz and David Wellman, 
Whitewashing Race: The Myth of a Colour-Blind Society (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2003) with 
some studies countenancing Britain (see: Amy Ansell, New Right, New Racism: Race and Reaction in the United 
States and Britain (New York, New York University Press, 1997) and James Rhodes, ‘Revisiting the 2001 
Riots: New Labour and the Rise of 'Colour Blind Racism'’ (2009) 14(5) Sociological Research Online: 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/14/5/3.html. For a related analysis of how the rise of ‘post sectarian’ 
and ‘good relations’ discourses following the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement have allowed the Northern 
Ireland state to hide its incapacity to address rising racism and sectarianism see: Robbie McVeigh and Bill 
Rolston, ‘From Good Friday to Good Relations: sectarianism, racism and the Northern Ireland state’ 
(2007) 48(4) Race & Class 1-23. 
7 Per Gillen J in A and B (by C, their mother and next friend) v A (Health and Social Services Trust) [2010] NIQB, 
para 24. 
8 Per Girvan LJ in A and B (by C, their mother and next friend) v A (Health and Social Services Trust) [2011] 
NICA 28, para 10. On the connection between a state’s commitment to neo-liberal policies and the 
incumbent emphasis on the individual to a corresponding reduction of focus on structural racism and 
inequality see: David Goldberg, The Threat of Race: Reflections on Racial Neoliberalism (USA, Wiley-Blackwell, 
2009). 
9 Defined by Rosemary Hunter as one of the techniques of feminist judging (‘Can Feminist Judges Make a 
Difference?’ (2008) 15 International Journal of the Legal Profession 7). 
10 For a critical consideration of the relationship between nature and culture in ideas about race see: Peter 
Wade, Race, Nature and Culture (London, Pluto Press, 2002). On race as social construction see: David 
Goldberg (1993) Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning (Blackwell) and Goldberg, above n 8. 
11 Above n 7 at para 24. 
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their futures. Awarding damages for having the ‘wrong’ colour of skin is clearly 
neither desirable nor an effective way in which to address the structural issues 
informing what is right or wrong. However, Gillen J occupies a site of significant 
racial (as well as social) privilege; it is perhaps this which informs his comparisons 
of the children’s skin colour to hair and eye colour or intelligence, belying the 
potential impacts of racism in society.  
The children’s experiences are reflected by research into racism in schools in 
Northern Ireland which found that three-quarters (75%) of children from ethnic 
minority groups had experienced derogatory racist name calling.12  A significant 
number (42%) of minority ethnic 16-year-old students reported having been a 
victim of ‘racist bullying or harassment’ in their school which can impede 
academic progress and have a significantly detrimental effect on a victim’s 
economic future. The situation appears to fare just as bad in the workplace, with 
the report suggesting that racism had supplanted traditional cross-community 
sectarianism as the main reason for employees being harassed, bullied or 
threatened in their places of work.13  Therefore, McCandless LJ is right to question 
the judicial failure in the original judgments to expand up on the societal source of 
the racism suffered by the children and the possible longevity of this impact on 
their wellbeing.  
In drawing attention to the operation of racial and other inequalities 
McCandless LJ indicates the feminist judgment as a broader commentary on social 
relations and justice and takes the opportunity to consider the role of law – 
however limited – in ameliorating prejudice and disadvantage. The rewritten 
judgment also foregrounds the children’s concerns in a manner reflective of 
feminist values in recognising the individual as expert of their own experience, 
particularly when faced with a counter-narrative that represents the dominant race, 
class and status.14  McCandless LJ’s invocation of ‘the history of structural racism’ 
evident in Northern Ireland importantly addresses the real implications of 
inequality, unfairness, distress or prejudice incurred by the children (and their 
parents). A fuller examination of this proves integral to understanding the cultural 
dynamics of the case.  
 
THE IMPACT OF NORTHERN IRELAND’S CULTURAL DYNAMICS 
 
Even if you do not see yourself in a box, others may put you there and close 
the lid.15  
 
At the time of the original ruling, Northern Ireland was over a dozen years into 
the peace process which signalled an end to the worst of the previous three 
                                                     
12 Robbie McVeigh and An Dúchán, The Next Stephen Lawrence? Racist Violence and Criminal Justice in 
Northern Ireland (2005) Research Report for the Northern Ireland Council for Ethnic Minorities. 
13 Ibid. 
14 This approach borrows from the tradition of feminist standpoint theory: Sandra Harding (ed), The 
Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader (New York and London, Routledge, 2004). For critical and reflective 
discussions see: Susan Hekman, ‘Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited’ (1997) 2(2) 
Signs 341-365 and Sandra Harding, ‘Standpoint Theories: Productively Controversial’ (2009) 24(4) Hypatia 
192-200. 
15 Edna Longley, ‘Multi-Culturalism and Northern Ireland: Making Differences Fruitful’ in Edna Longley 
and Declan Kiberd, Multi-Culturalism: The View from Two Irelands (Cork, Cork University Press, 2001), 2. 
                        24/2015 
 
 6 
decades of cross-community sectarian conflict.16  Rapid changes occurred within a 
short period of time, particularly with respect to increasingly visible cultural 
diversity and difference, as urban areas such as Belfast became popular for 
economic migrants seeking to resettle in the UK. However, Gillen J’s comment 
about Northern Ireland’s ‘multicultural’ nature17  is somewhat ambitious given that 
just 1.8% of the population (32,400 people) belonged to an ethnic minority group 
in 2011, double the number recorded in 2001 (0.8%).18   
These cultural changes were not always met with accepting attitudes; several 
high-profile incidents motivated by racial hostility, particularly against members of 
the Roma community in 2008,19 led to Northern Ireland being branded the ‘hate 
crime capital of Europe’ and ‘race hate capital of UK’ in the media,20 casting doubt 
on the supposed inclusivity of the ‘new’ purportedly ‘post conflict’ and ‘post 
sectarian’ Northern Ireland. Surveys on racial integration have unsurprisingly 
indicated that the majority of people believe that minority ethnic communities face 
‘a lot’ of prejudice in Northern Ireland and an awareness that racial prejudice had 
increased, rather than abated, over time.21  These perceptions correlate with 
official data showing that reports of racially motivated incidents have increased 
annually.22  However, just 12 out of 13,655 hate-motivated offences reported to 
the police between 2008 and 2012 resulted in a successful prosecution.23  
Therefore, whilst it is true to suggest that the children’s genes did not render them 
‘victims’ at the hands of the clinic; the clinic’s error had indeed put them at greater 
risk of victimisation from wider society. 
Montague and Shirlow have described the growth in racist hate crimes in 
Northern Ireland as often being ‘a crude way of “defending” resources coupled 
with notions of protecting community identity from the “outsider”’.24  Identity 
hostility has evidently extended beyond the sectarian divide; the past experiences 
                                                     
16 This sectarian conflict, known as ‘The Troubles’, overshadowed other areas of cultural development at 
a time in history when elsewhere in the UK civil rights movements were gaining traction for race 
relations, sexual minorities and women’s equality. As a result, the primacy of ameliorating Northern 
Ireland’s pressing sectarian problem meant that addressing other forms of prejudice – such as racism, 
sexism or homophobia – featured far lower down on the hierarchy of need. 
17 Above n 7 at 23. 
18 Northern Ireland Census, Key Statistics Summary Report (2011). Available at: 
http://www.nisra.gov.uk/archive/census/2011/results/key-statistics/summary-report.pdf (accessed 24 
June 2015). 
19 BBC News, ‘Romanians leave Northern Ireland after attacks’ (23 June 2009). Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8114234.stm (accessed 24 June 2015). 
20 Belfast Telegraph, ‘Two racist attacks are taking place every day in Northern Ireland – with fears 
Belfast is rapidly becoming the race hate capital of the UK’ (21 April 2014). Available at: 
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/two-racist-attacks-every-day-in-northern-
irelands-racehate-crime-surge-30202329.html (accessed 24 June 2015). 
21 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey dataset. Available at: 
http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/results/mineth.html (accessed 24 June 2015). 
22 Datasets made available by the Police Service of Northern Ireland indicated an increase of 36% to 
1,132 incidents and 51% to 796 crimes in the 12 months to June 2014. Available at: 
http://www.psni.police.uk/index/updates/updates_statistics/updates_hate_motivation_statistics.htm 
(accessed 24 June 2015). 
23 Ibid. 
24 Richard Montague and Peter Shirlow, Challenging Racism: Ending Hate (2010). Available at: 
http://www.qub.ac.uk/research-centres/isctsj/filestore/Filetoupload,472425,en.pdf (accessed 24 June 
2015). 
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and future fears expressed in this case may be linked to racism rather than 
sectarianism, but one cannot be condoned/eradicated only for an alternative to 
take its place.25   As traditional sectarian tensions abate, it appears that space has 
opened up in which other forms of targeted prejudice are recognised.26  The 
traditionally Christian-inspired cultural conservatism informing Northern Irish 
politics and society – poignantly captured by Girvan LJ reciting a Psalm at the start 
of the original Court of Appeal judgment27 – has also been a contributing factor in 
the stagnation of socio-legal progress, such as ensuring equality and rights for 
racial, religious and sexual minorities and implementing full legal protection from 
(and redress for) discrimination, persecution and victimisation.  This case offered a 
significant – but missed – opportunity for judges in Northern Ireland to develop 
the common law in the context of addressing the harms that emanate from 
identity-based persecution. While the feminist judgment embraces the novelty of 
the case to develop the legal principles pertaining to substandard fertility 
treatment, Gillen J and Girvan LJ firmly operated within the law as given,28  to 
include a keen deference to Parliament and a straightforward application of 
‘wrongful birth’ precedents to a case that quite simply wasn’t about a wrongful 
birth. 
 
SITUATING THE FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 
 
Feminism has long been critical of the power of law to effect progressive social 
change29 and the dilemmas presented by this case are similarly present in other 
areas of law designed to countenance racial prejudice and victimisation. For 
example, ‘hate crimes’ and their related legislation are subjective in nature, 
situating the perception of harm and motive with the victim. Taking this stance, the 
children’s experiences – and fears – are valid, but if addressed accordingly, emulate 
the problems inherent to ‘hate crime’ legislation – namely, that laws seek to punish 
the individual rather than address broader issues in society. An important feminist 
question to be asked of McCandless LJ’s judgment is whether it achieves a better 
outcome not just for the individual claimants, but also for wider society through 
development of the law?  
In not holding the clinic fully liable for the emotional distress and 
disadvantage experienced by the children, the feminist judgment in part reaches 
the same outcome as the original. However, McCandless LJ deploys significantly 
different reasoning in reaching this conclusion. First, she holds that a duty of care 
was owed by the clinic to the children because of their interconnected interests in 
their parents’ treatment. In doing so, she lends judicial embrace to the feminist-
                                                     
25 Marian Duggan, ‘Sectarianism and Hate Crime in Northern Ireland’ in Nathan Hall, Abbee Corb, Paul 
Giannasi and John Grieve (eds) The International Handbook on Hate Crime (Abingdon, Routledge, 2014) 
117-128. 
26 Marian Duggan, Queering Conflict: Examining Lesbian and Gay Experiences of Homophobia in Northern Ireland 
(Farnham, Ashgate, 2012). 
27 Above n 8 at 1. 
28 See further: Stephen Livingstone, ‘And Justice for All? The Judiciary and the Legal Profession in 
Transition’ in Colin Harvey (ed) Human Rights, Equality and Democratic Renewal in Northern Ireland (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2001) 131-161. 
29 Carol Smart, The Power of Law (London, Routledge, 1989). 
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inspired concept of relational autonomy.30  This seems to be particularly important 
given the reproductive and familial context of the case.31  Second, she subverts 
judicial reliance on policy-based reasoning that is underpinned by abstract 
‘reasonable man’32 assumptions by rejecting the ‘healthy child’ exemption to the 
normal principles of recovery33 and instead developing policy-based reasoning 
around societal accountability for inequality and class-based injury. Here, she takes 
inspiration from feminist scholarship which problematises the conventional tort 
idea of individualised and privatised injury, as well as the dichotomised 
demarcation between private and public law spheres.34  While the feminist 
judgment does insist on holding the clinic accountable for their careless treatment 
by ordering the payment of a conventional award of £15,000, it also points to the 
responsibility of public authorities in Northern Ireland to take positive action to 
ameliorate the effects of racism in society. The possibility of a conventional award 
was rejected in the original judgments on the basis that the children had not 
suffered any loss or damage. By teasing out the children’s relational interests in 
having their parents’ treatment preferences upheld, McCandless LJ retells their 
story in a way that refuses to dismiss their distress and lived experiences. She also 
gives judicial notice to feminist critiques of previous conventional awards in cases 
involving reproduction, by making clear the different context in which this award 
is granted i.e. not as a pale substitute to an award of full damages which would 
otherwise have been recoverable ‘but for’ a policy-based exception to the usual 
rules of recovery.35  Rather, the award is ordered here in acknowledgment of the 
substandard treatment and as a way of helping to make the children’s lives better. 
An alternative feminist approach could have reasonably seen the complete 
dismissal of the children’s claim on the basis that it is impossible for conventional 
tort law doctrine to countenance class-based injury36 or that to award monetary 
compensation in the circumstances would be to shore up patriarchal ideas about 
inheritance, race and family structures.37  While McCandless LJ appears to accept 
such critiques in her judgment, she reasons that to so reject the children’s claim 
entirely would be to attack a ‘symptom’ of patriarchy rather than its root causes. 
Her approach is marked by sensitivity towards the prevalence of ‘family secrets’ in 
                                                     
30 Jennifer Nedelsky, ‘Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities’ (1989) 1 Yale Journal 
of Law and Feminism 7–36. On the use of relational autonomy in a judgment about refusal of life saving 
medical treatment, see ch 20 by Claire Murray (commentary) and Mary Donnelly (feminist judgment). 
31 For an application of relational autonomy to family law see: Jonathan Herring, Relational autonomy 
and Family Law (London, SpringerBriefs in Law, 2014). 
32 Leslie Bender, ‘A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort’ (1988) 38 Journal of Legal Education 3. 
33 McFarlane and another v Tayside Health Board [1999] UKHL 50; Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS 
Trust [2003] UKHL 52. See Nicolette Priaulx, The harm paradox: tort law and the unwanted child in an era of 
choice (London, Routledge-Cavendish, 2007). 
34 Adrian Howe, ‘The Problem of Privatized Injuries: Feminist Strategies for Litigation’ in Martha 
Fineman and Nancy Thomadsen (eds), At the Boundaries of Law: Feminism and Legal Theory (New York, 
Routledge, 1991) 148-168. Leslie Bender, ‘Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass 
Torts, Power, and Responsibilities’ (1990) 39(4) Duke Law Journal 848, 864-72. 
35 Nicolette Priaulx, ‘Damages for the "unwanted" child: time for a rethink?’ (2005) 73(4) Medico-Legal 
Journal 152-163. 
36 See further Regina Graycar ‘A Feminist Adjudication Process: Is There Such a Thing?’ in Ulrike 
Schultz, Gisela Shaw (eds), Gender and Judging (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013) 436-457. 
37 See again, Hill Collins, above n 5. 
  
Marian Duggan & Julie McCandless                                        “Right Thinking People” 
 
 9 
the context of reproduction and fertility treatment.38  This is perhaps controversial 
in a national context haunted by the brutality of what James Smith has 
conceptualised as ‘an architecture of containment’ whereby state institutions 
‘concealed’ marginalised citizens, typically ‘fallen women’  who transgressed social 
mores and dominant morality.39  A criticism that could therefore be levied at the 
feminist judgment is that it smacks of ‘keeping up appearances’ in order to ensure 
the cultural primacy of the biological family,40 akin to the political refusal to 
extend abortion provision in Northern Ireland while hundreds of Northern Irish 
women travel abroad each year for pregnancy termination.41  However, 
McCandless LJ’s concern with family secrets and ‘passing’ does not seem 
motivated by shame or containment discourses, but rather with acknowledging the 
family’s interests in having the parents’ legitimate expectations upheld in a 
reproductive context whereby people must necessarily articulate choices and 
preferences that often go unspoken. In doing so, she hints at an alternative way 
that this case could have been argued by counsel; that of the clinic interfering with 
the privacy interests of both the children and the parents.42   
  
 
  
                                                     
38 Carol Smart, Personal Life (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007); Petra Nordqvist and Carol Smart, Relative 
Strangers: Family life, genes and donor conception (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
39 Smith writes in the specific national context of Ireland rather than Northern Ireland, but it seems likely 
that the women incarcerated in Magdalene Laundry institutions in Northern Ireland shared similar 
experiences to women in Ireland: see https://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/doc_23218.pdf 
(accessed 25 August 2015). The Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry currently taking place in Northern 
Ireland is only taking evidence from persons who were under 18 when they were in a residential 
institution, precluding many women who would have been incarcerated in Magdalen Laundries or similar 
institutions:  http://www.hiainquiry.org/ (accessed 25 August 2015).   
40 Martha Fineman, The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies (Oxford, 
Routledge, 1995); Alison Diduck, Law’s Families (London, LexisNexis, 2003); Julie McCandless and Sally 
Sheldon, ‘The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (2008) and the Tenacity of the Sexual Family 
Form’ (2010) 73(2) Modern Law Review 175-207. 
41 Ann Rossiter, Ireland's Hidden Diaspora: The Abortion Trail and the Making of a London-Irish Underground, 
1980-2000 (London, IASC Publishing, 2009). 
42 This argument was not developed in the feminist judgment as it was not introduced by counsel. While 
appellate courts can introduce new matters of law, they must restrict their decision to arguments that 
have been presented. On framing the case in terms of privacy, see Sally Sheldon, ‘Only Skin Deep? The 
harm of being born a different colour to one’s parents’ 19(4) Medical Law Review 657-668. 
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9 MARCH, 24 JUNE 2011 
 
24 June 2011. The following judgment of the court was delivered. 
 
McCANDLESS LJ.43  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] At the heart of this case are a family who have suffered distress following 
negligent treatment at a licensed fertility clinic. The clinic operates under the 
auspices of the respondent Health and Social Services Trust. The appellants, A 
and B, are the children of the family; twins, now aged almost sixteen. They were 
eleven years old when the proceedings began in October 2006. The issue is 
whether they can recover damages against the clinic.  
 
[2] The family’s distress follows from the clinic’s careless selection of donor sperm 
for the mother’s IVF treatment. The parents are both White and, in line with 
accepted clinical practice at the time of treatment – and indeed, formal guidance 
from the Regulator, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) 
– they requested that the mother’s eggs be inseminated with sperm from a donor 
classified as ‘Caucasian’ so that any children born through her IVF treatment 
would, with all probability, appear racially similar. Instead, and unbeknownst to 
the parents, sperm from a donor classified as ‘Caucasian (Cape Coloured)’ was 
used. As a result, the children have different and darker skin colour from their 
parents. Their skin colour is also markedly different from each other. 
 
                                                     
43 I would like to thank Máiréad Enright, Sarah Keenan and Sally Sheldon for their very helpful 
comments on earlier versions of this judgment, as well as Antony Blackburn-Starza for discussing his 
doctoral research with me. 
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[3] As a result, the children allege in their statement of claim that they have 
suffered distress and emotional upset following abusive and derogatory comments 
from other children and adults. These comments have been about their difference 
in appearance from each other, and from their parents. Some comments were 
racially abusive. They further assert that their quality of life has been adversely 
affected and that they may suffer future loss and damage. Finally, if either twin 
goes on to have a genetically related child with a mixed race partner, any child 
born to them is likely to be of different skin colour than either parent. 
 
[4] At the High Court, my colleague Girvan J dismissed the claim in its entirety.  
 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE 
 
[5] The points raised in this case are novel and important. There are few cases 
pertaining to negligence in this context, and indeed, this is the first action to be 
brought by children conceived through negligent treatment. The case therefore 
provides a valuable opportunity for an appellate court to publicly consider, clarify 
and question the legal principles in this area, in contrast to the more usual ‘out of 
court’ settlements following substandard care or treatment provision.  
 
[6] The case is also significant because the appellants’ emotional distress emerges 
from a situation that no court in this jurisdiction – and possibly no other 
jurisdiction – has yet considered in the context of a negligence claim: that to be 
born a different skin colour from your parent(s) and sibling(s), and to receive 
racist and other derogatory abuse because of these differences, constitutes legally 
actionable harm against a negligent provider of fertility services whose carelessness 
caused you to be so born. This is not only a novel question but also a deeply 
uncomfortable and difficult one, for it simultaneously relies on and challenges 
racism in society. Gillen J, in determining that the appellants “do not carry the seal 
of another person’s fault” [28], articulated something that I do not think he 
intended; for it is potentially problematic to attribute the distress that the 
appellants have suffered to the ‘fault’ of any one person, when the reality is that 
the mistake only matters because of the pervasiveness of racism in society. I have 
found it difficult to consider these important issues of public policy and 
accountability in the context of a negligence claim, the strictures of which petition 
me to individualise fault. While it seems important to hold the clinic accountable 
for substandard treatment, whether this can or should translate into damages for 
emotional distress because of racist and other derogatory abuse is far from 
straightforward.   
 
DISTINGUISHING WRONGFUL LIFE AND WRONGFUL BIRTH CASES  
 
[7] That the claim comes from the children, rather than the parents, signifies it as 
what has become known in legal terms as a ‘wrongful life’ claim i.e. where a child 
alleges that, but for the defendant’s negligence, she would not have been born and, 
hence, the harm she now suffers would have been avoided. The last time a claim 
like this was considered in this jurisdiction was almost thirty years ago by the 
English Court of Appeal in McKay v Essex Area Health Authority [1982] QB 1166. 
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McKay determined that disabled children can have no reasonable cause of action in 
‘wrongful entry into life’ claims following negligent pre-natal screening which 
failed to diagnose the cause of the injury. This was on the policy basis that the 
alternative was non-existence by affording the mother an opportunity to terminate 
her pregnancy. The framing of such actions as being about existence per se has 
been heavily criticised on the basis that it fails to capture the reality of the issue, 
which is that the claimant is alive and suffering because of another’s negligence 
(JK Mason (2007) The Troubled Pregnancy: Legal Rights and Wrongs in Pregnancy 
(Cambridge University Press)). This policy decision to prohibit such claims means 
that justice becomes highly elusive for child claimants who must bear the brunt of 
the consequences of substandard treatment without any possibility of recovery of 
damages. A few courts have permitted wrongful life claims, reasoning that a 
claimant can be both benefitted (born) and harmed (injured) at the same time 
(Curlender v Bio-Science Laboratories (1980) 106 Cal App 3d 811) or that an award of 
damages would appeal to justice in helping the claimant lead a more bearable life 
(Leids Universitair Medisch Centrum v Kelly Molenaar, no C03/206, RvdW 2005, 42 (18 
March 2005)). However, despite powerful dissenting judgments which frame the 
actions as being about ‘wrongful suffering’ (Kirby J in Harriton v Stephens [2006] 
HCA 15), the development of the law in most jurisdictions has proceeded along 
the same lines as McKay. While an appropriate time may yet come for McKay to be 
reconsidered, the case before us does not present such an opportunity. The 
preponderance of analogous authority makes it impossible to contend that the 
McKay decision was given per incuriam. The reality that potentially unjust doctrine 
reinforces itself – because cases in other jurisdictions have relied heavily on McKay 
in their reasoning – does not go unnoticed by this court.  
 
[8] Gillen J did not consider the applicability of McKay to the present case and 
neither counsel for the appellants or the respondent has referred to it in their 
arguments. However, given that McKay is still good law and could potentially bar a 
negligence claim such as this from proceeding, I will make clear how the case 
before us is distinguishable. 
 
[9] In McKay the child, Mary, was born disabled because her mother, Jacinta, 
contracted rubella during her pregnancy, which the defendant doctor negligently 
failed to diagnose. Ultimately the rubella, rather than the negligent diagnosis, 
caused the child’s dreadful injuries. This was why Mary had no claim under the 
Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976, which imposes liability when a 
careless action of a defendant causes a child to be born with disabilities. In Mary’s 
case, the negligence meant that her mother continued with her pregnancy, when 
she might otherwise have not, had the diagnosis been correct. In the case before 
us, the respondent’s negligence – the incorrect selection of donor sperm – is the 
direct cause of the children being born mixed-race instead of White, as their parents 
intended. While different – presumably White – children would have been born 
had the respondent not been negligent, the appellant children’s suffering stems 
directly from their careless actions. It is not the case that the respondent’s 
negligence deprived the appellants’ mother of an opportunity to terminate her 
pregnancy; and indeed, even if the respondent’s mistake had come to light during 
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their mother’s pregnancy, a termination would not have been available to her in 
this jurisdiction given the restrictive conditions in which abortion is legally 
available in Northern Ireland.  
 
[10] For these reasons, the appellants’ claim is distinguished from McKay and is 
therefore permitted as a free standing action, rather than only being arguable 
through a proxy ‘wrongful birth’, or some other, claim by their parents. To allow a 
free-standing action from the children is important as it means that the ability to 
recover damages is not reliant on an action from the parents that effectively 
requires them to portray their children as a burden; something which most, if not 
all, parents would find objectionable.  
 
[11] So that the children’s claim can be considered on its own terms, I also want to 
make clear how it is distinguishable from precedent relating to wrongful birth 
claims from parents. In McFarlane and another v Tayside Health Board [1999] UKHL 
50, the House of Lords determined that the parent(s) of an unintended but healthy 
child may no longer recover damages for the child’s upkeep from a negligent 
defendant. This exception to the ordinary principles of recovery for negligence 
was reaffirmed in a subsequent wrongful birth case of Rees v Darlington Memorial 
Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52. Gillen J interpreted these cases to mean that 
as a matter of legal policy, no damages may be recovered where a child is born 
healthy and without disability or impairment [21]. For whatever reason, counsel 
for the appellants presented no arguments to the contrary. However, and with 
respect, to interpret the ratio of these cases so widely would mean that the 
common law would be forever fossilised. The law would be unable to develop 
incrementally in response to new forms of damage, for all future cases involving 
healthy children would simply be barred, even where they suffer from some novel 
type of personal injury or loss. This cannot be what the House of Lords intended.  
 
[12] While the children in this case are healthy, their claim is substantively different 
from the claims in McFarlane and Rees, which were claims from parent(s) for the 
upkeep of their unintended child, where the defendant’s carelessness caused the 
child to be born. In the case before us, the parents sought medical treatment in 
order to help them try and have children, rather than prevent conception and 
pregnancy. The context of fertility treatment, and the reproductive choices which 
it makes explicit, renders the appellants’ parents’ situation very different from 
Laura and George McFarlane – who sought to avoid the birth of a fifth child 
which they felt they could not afford – and Karina Rees – who sought to avoid 
having children at all because of her own physical disabilities. As the appellants’ 
parents have negotiated settlement out of court with the respondent trust, we do 
not know if a legal claim from them against the respondent trust would have been 
successful, given the fertility treatment, as opposed to sterilisation context. 
However, what we do know is that the case before us is a claim from children – 
not parents – in relation to their emotional distress – not existence per se – which 
they would not have suffered had the respondent not been careless. They are not 
seeking to recover for their lifetime’s upkeep, and although it is unclear precisely 
what level of damages they do seek should their claim be successful, their 
counsel’s argument that they are at least entitled to a conventional award, as was 
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permitted in Rees (£15,000), signals something more modest. For these reasons, I 
determine that the present case is distinguishable from McFarlane and Rees and that 
the policy exception developed in these cases does not prevent the children from 
having an arguable case. 
 
DUTY OF CARE 
 
[13] Whether a duty of care exists on given facts is a question of law. For a 
claimant to be owed a duty of care by the defendant there must be sufficient 
proximity of relationship between the parties and the damage must be reasonably 
foreseeable (Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562; Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman 
(1990) 2 AC 605). In this case, we must determine whether the clinic owed the 
children a duty of care not to harm them. Gillen J framed the question to be asked 
as: “Was there a duty owed to the cells that the eggs would not be so fertilised?” 
and concluded that it would be inappropriate for a first instance judge to vest 
human cells with the relevant status for a duty of care to be owed. He determined 
that this was an issue for Parliament as it would involve the court venturing “into 
the complexities of the creation of life involving a unique physical and scientific 
process”. 
 
[14] With respect, the court is not being asked whether fertility clinics owe duties 
to human reproductive cells – for such would be absurd – but rather, whether they 
owe a duty of care to the children born from the treatment services that they 
provide. Such duty is clearly owed. As counsel for the appellants quite rightly 
submitted at trial, the respondent is a provider of fertility treatment; the very 
purpose of which is to help patients conceive and have children. The duty, 
therefore, is not properly reflected in the summoning of an image of a cluster of 
cells, but must instead be considered in the broader context of the purpose of the 
service and the class of persons countenanced through the provision.  
 
[15] Support for this position can be derived from both statute and the common 
law. There is legislative direction relating to the establishment of a duty of care in 
the context of fertility treatment. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990 inserted section 1A into the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liabilities) Act 
1976. The effect of this provision is to extend liability under the 1976 Act to 
injuries suffered as a result of fertility treatment because of, for example, negligent 
storage of gametes or embryos, or, as in this case their negligent selection. Gillen J 
correctly states that the 1976 Act does not apply to the children in this case given 
that they have suffered no congenital disability as a result of the clinic’s negligence. 
However, the 1976 Act does afford for the possibility of recognising that fertility 
practitioners owe a duty of care to children born through the provision of fertility 
treatment. I cannot agree with Gillen J that the 1976 Act “settled” [10] the 
question of when “a foetus” has sufficient status to be owed a duty of care. This is 
for two reasons. First, the 1976 Act did not establish any duty of care towards 
foetuses. A foetus does not have legal standing to make a claim, whether in 
negligence or some other area of law. Instead, the 1976 Act afforded such 
standing to children born with a congenital disability because of an “occurrence” 
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which affected either parent’s ability to have a non-disabled child, or affected the 
mother during pregnancy. The claim is brought against the person responsible for 
the occurrence. Section 1A extends this provision to encompass negligently 
provided fertility treatment. If, following such an occurrence, a woman terminated 
her pregnancy because foetal abnormalities were detected in pre-natal screening – 
an option that I note is not available to women in Northern Ireland unlike women 
in Great Britain and many other jurisdictions – there would be no possibility of a 
claim under the 1976 Act, because no child suffering injury would be born. 
Second, it would be overly rigid to conclude that, in limiting this provision to cases 
involving congenital disability, Parliament was signalling its intent to forever limit 
the scope of the duty so that only children born with congenital disabilities could 
recover damages. It is credible that the type of case before us was simply not 
contemplated by Parliamentarians in the process of reforming a piece of legislation 
designed to deal with the consequences of congenital disability, and originally 
enacted before the dawn of IVF and at a time when donor insemination was only 
beginning to be accepted as routine clinical practice. In this court’s view the 1976 
Act does not preclude courts from incrementally developing the common law in 
the face of novel situations such as the appellants’ claim; healthy children alleging 
a different type of harm following negligent fertility treatment. 
 
[16] What is more helpful to consider is when the 1976 Act countenances the 
existence of a duty between the providers of fertility treatment and the children 
born from the treatment, so that we can draw parallels to the present novel 
situation. Section 1A (2) makes clear that the ‘defendant’ will be answerable to the 
child if he or she was liable in tort to one or both of the parents. For the purposes 
of this section it does not matter whether or not the parents have suffered any 
actionable injury. All that needs to be made out is that a duty of care was owed to 
the parents of any child making a claim against the defendants. In the case of 
fertility treatment, as with other medical treatments, this is straightforward.  
 
[17] The common law also signals the existence of a duty of care. Burton v Islington 
HA [1992] EWCA Civ 2 decided that a duty of care can ‘crystallise’ at birth, for it 
is at birth that the child sustains injuries as a living person. As with the 1976 Act, 
this ruling related to the specific context of congenital disability caused by pre-
natal – rather than pre-implantation – injury caused by the defendant. However, 
the principle established in relation to when a duty of care exists is likewise 
instructive. This case also appropriately limits any duty on the part of the 
respondent clinic to children that are born and suffer harm as a result of 
negligently provided treatment, allaying Gillen J’s concern that he would be 
establishing a duty of care between fertility providers and human cells. Such a 
development would indeed be concerning, for extending legal duties in this way 
would attribute the same legal personality to cells, embryos and foetuses as living 
persons; rather than it being clear that legal rights of action only come into 
existence at birth (Re MB [1997] EWCA Civ 3093). However, that is not what the 
court is being asked to determine in this case. The actual question is much more 
limited: do the appellant children have sufficient status to be owed a duty of care 
by the respondent clinic?  
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[18] The respondent clearly owed the children’s parents a duty of care to provide 
treatment that did not fall below the requisite standard. This court therefore 
determines that the respondent owed the appellants a duty of care to avoid acts or 
omissions that would be likely to harm them. The reproductive nature of the 
treatment provided by the respondent means that the relationships involved fall 
squarely within the well-established ‘neighbourhood’ paradigm. 
 
BREACH OF DUTY 
 
[19] In October 2003 the respondent sent a letter to the appellants’ parents 
detailing the mistake that had been made in the careless selection of donor sperm. 
This letter detailed the potential effects of using sperm from a ‘Caucasian (Cape 
Coloured)’ donor and confirmed that the usual clinical practice would be that only 
sperm from a ‘Caucasian’ donor would be used in treatment as this was what had 
been agreed with the parents. In using the wrong sperm the respondent’s actions 
fell below the reasonably expected standard of care in the provision of fertility 
treatment. For avoidance of doubt, and because this issue was not specifically 
addressed by the High Court, the effects of using sperm from a ‘Caucasian (Cape 
Coloured)’ donor were either known, or should reasonably have been known, by 
the respondent. This is not a case where scientific evidence has come to light since 
the mistake was made. Nor is it a case where it fell within the parameters of 
reasonable clinical practice for the respondent to use sperm from a donor other 
than a ‘Caucasian’ donor. This is because, and as the evidence makes clear, the use 
of sperm from only a ‘Caucasian’ donor was a crucial component of the parents’ 
consent to the mother’s IVF treatment. 
 
[20] I conclude that this is sufficient to establish breach of duty for the purposes 
of the appellants’ claim. However, I offer further reasons as to why this violation 
of the appellants’ parents’ consent to treatment means that the respondent’s 
actions fell below the reasonably expected standard of care towards the appellants. 
 
[21] Reproductive technology and genetic screening allow for selections which we 
might not otherwise be able to make. For example, pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis (PGD) can be used to select embryos which are not affected with a 
particular genetic condition, or embryos of a particular sex. Fertility treatment also 
makes explicit preferences that we do not necessarily articulate in other 
reproductive contexts. If the appellants’ parents had been able to have children 
who were genetically related to both of them it seems unlikely that they would at 
any stage have had to articulate their preference of having a racially similar child. 
However, the need for donor sperm in their treatment meant that this preference 
had to be expressed. It is important to note that this was not done in a regulatory 
vacuum. The regulatory framework gives guidance on certain preferences. In 
relation to the sex selection of embryos, guidance in the Regulator’s Code of 
Practice, and since 2008 the legislation itself (Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 1990 (as amended), Schedule 2 para 1ZB), only permits such for medical 
reasons, as opposed to those that are regarded as non-medical or social. The racial 
matching of gamete donors and prospective parents is not referred to in the 
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legislation, but the Code of Practice gives guidance to fertility clinics. At the time 
of the appellant parents’ treatment – 1995 – the Code of Practice stated the 
following: 
 
“When selecting donated gametes for treatment, centres should take into account 
each prospective parent’s preferences in relation to the general physical 
characteristics of the donor which can be matched in accordance with good 
clinical practice.” (3.20, Code of Practice, 2nd Edition, revised June 1993) 
 
At the time of the relevant treatment, ‘good clinical practice’ included racial 
matching, as confirmed by the new wording of the revised Code of Practice of 
December 1995 (a few months after the treatment): 
 
“When selecting donated gametes for treatment, centres should take into account 
each prospective parent’s preferences in relation to the general physical 
characteristics of the donor. This does not allow the prospective parents to 
choose, for social reasons alone, a donor of a different ethnic origin(s) from 
themselves.” (3.22, Code of Practice, 3rd Edition, revised December 1995) 
 
[22] We may agree or disagree with this guidance. But for the purposes of this 
claim it is important because it makes clear that the appellants’ parents would have 
had strong expectations that their preference would be upheld, given the 
regulatory framework. For sake of clarity, the respondent’s carelessness is not 
covered by the warning in the guidance that any attempt at matching physical 
characteristics cannot be guaranteed for this is clearly referring to the fact that 
genes are far from determinative, whether in relation to physical, or indeed other, 
characteristics. The appellant children were not born mixed-race because of 
genetic variation: they were born mixed race because the respondent’s carelessly 
used the wrong donor sperm. It is for this reason that I must disagree with Gillen 
J who gave considerable weight to the argument presented by counsel for the 
respondent – that because we are all the product of a mixed gene pool where 
variations and random mutations are ever possible – in determining that the 
appellant children could have no legitimate expectation to be born with certain 
racial characteristics.   
 
[23] Finally, the appellants’ parents would have been offered counselling on the 
basis of receiving treatment using donor sperm from a ‘Caucasian’ donor only. In 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 there is a statutory 
requirement that fertility clinics provide patients with suitable opportunities for 
counselling before any treatment takes place (section 13(6); Schedule 3 para 3(1)a). 
This means that although counselling is not compulsory for fertility patients an 
opportunity for counselling must be provided by licensed clinics. The Code of 
Practice draws particular attention to what is known as ‘Implications Counselling’ 
(see sections 6.10-6.15 of the 2nd edition, which was the version in place at the 
time of the appellants’ parents’ treatment) whereby counsellors should invite 
patients to consider, inter alia, “the implications of the procedure for themselves, 
their family and social circle, and any resultant children” (section 6.10(b)) and 
where treatment will involve the use of donated gametes, “their perceptions of the 
                        24/2015 
 
 18 
needs of the child throughout his or her child and adolescence” (section 6.12(b)). 
We do not know in this case whether the appellants’ parents availed of this 
counselling. However, it is clear that the statutory framework signals the 
importance of affording fertility patients an opportunity to think through the 
consequences of possible fertility treatment, not just for their own benefit, but for 
the benefit of existing and future familial relationships. This reflects the reality that 
any breach of duty relating to the mistaken use of donor sperm is interconnected: 
as well as interfering with the parents’ autonomy to make reproductive decisions, 
it has a broader impact on the family and personal life of children born from the 
fertility treatment, as well as on existing family members such as older siblings and 
grandparents. Gillen J was of the opinion that the appellant children could have 
no legitimate expectation other than to be born healthy and well [34]. I disagree on 
this point. As children born from legally regulated fertility treatment, the 
appellants are entitled to expect that factors crucial to their parents’ consent to 
fertility treatment should have been upheld by the respondent. This is because 
these factors have a fundamental and interconnected impact on their personal and 
familial existence in the world. 
 
[24] This means that the duty of care owed to the appellant children by the 
respondent was clearly breached. 
 
LOSS AND DAMAGE 
 
[25] The court must next address whether the appellants have suffered any legally 
recognisable loss and damage. Here, the court is not considering in general terms 
whether it is harmful for there to be racial difference between family members, or 
whether it is harmful to receive racist and other derogatory abuse because of one’s 
skin colour. Nor is it considering whether it is inherently harmful to be born a 
particular race. It must consider a much more specific question as to whether the 
appellant children have suffered legally recognisable harm because of the 
frustration of their parents’ gamete donor preference by the respondent. 
 
[26] I lay the question out in precise terms as the appellant children’s claim seems 
incorrectly framed in the High Court judgment, particularly in the determination 
that because the children have been born healthy they cannot have suffered any 
legal harm. Race and racial discrimination are difficult and sensitive issues and 
Gillen J has been studious in making clear that racial or ethnic discrimination in 
society is wrong [23]. On this point I agree. He has also been careful to make clear 
that to be born a particular race does not equate with being born ‘damaged’ or 
disabled [23-24]. This is also correct. However, with respect, the conflation of 
these general issues with the children’s claim has resulted in an inappropriate 
framing of their case, which is actually about whether they have suffered harm 
because of the respondent’s carelessness. In a rush to dissuade the children from 
seeing themselves as ‘victims’ because of the respondent’s carelessness, my 
colleague has failed to give adequate emphasis to both the role of the clinic in 
bringing this situation about and the specific circumstances which the children and 
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family find themselves in. He also, unfortunately, minimises the impact that the 
children’s skin colour has, and will continue to have, on their life. 
 
[27] However, while I disagree with much of Gillen J’s judgment, the question of 
whether the children have suffered legally recognisable harm is a difficult one, and 
without the benefit of my colleague’s initial judgment, I might have found it even 
more so. In reaching a decision, it is important for this court, as a public forum, to 
give an appropriate account of the difficulties that the children have experienced 
and are likely to continue to experience. 
 
[28] The children have received abuse for two main reasons: first, because their 
skin colour marks them as racially different from their parents and each other in a 
way that draws into question the assumed legitimacy of their family unit; and 
second, because their skin colour does not confer White privilege in a racist 
society. If the case before us involved non-White parents having a White child, 
when their preference was for a racially similar child, the issue of racist abuse – as 
opposed to familial dissimilarity – would likely be very different in their situation, 
if it was an issue at all. While Gillen J draws our attention to the principles which 
underlie multi-culturalism and the cruelty of members of society who would levy 
racist and other abuse at the appellant children, it would be unfortunate for a court 
to give the impression that racism was purely down to individual meanness and 
the crass behaviour of a minority in society who do not abide by the values of 
multi-culturalism. Given the often invisible and pervasive systems and structures 
which confer racial dominance on some members of society and not others, the 
values of multi-culturalism remain elusive and aspirational, rather than in any sense 
real. Northern Ireland is no exception here and we are increasingly seeing 
divisions, intolerance and violence being practiced in terms of racial, as much as 
sectarian and other political difference (Paul Connolly (2002) ‘Race’ and Racism in 
Northern Ireland: A Review of the Research Evidence, Equality Directorate of 
OFMDFM). While racism can manifest in exceptional, dramatic and often violent 
ways, it is important to remember that it is also present in ordinary and everyday 
life; and for some, it may well be saturating. The challenge for a non-White person 
of dealing with racism in a society where almost 98% of the population identify as 
White in the national census – whether White-British, White-Irish or White-Other 
– is not to be underestimated. 
 
[29] To not be White in Northern Ireland is a very visible thing indeed and the 
appellant children’s experiences may be compounded by the fact their parents and 
wider family network – which as far as I know all identify as White – will be 
unlikely to have faced similar challenges and may therefore find it difficult to 
provide support and guidance; however loved the children are and however well-
meaning the actions of their parents and other relatives. Furthermore, the 
challenge of being racially different to their parents may be further exacerbated by 
the fact that their parents never set out to create or raise children who were racially 
different from them. This family’s situation is therefore in contrast to mixed-race 
couples who have genetic offspring, or families where a child is adopted or 
fostered by a parent or parents who are a different race: in the former, the child 
reflects the ‘mixing’ of the parents’ genetic material, while in the latter, the 
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parent(s) make a deliberate decision to raise – rather than avoid raising – a child 
who is not a genetic reflection of them. Likewise, a couple or an individual may, 
for whatever reason, not select a gamete donor who is racially similar. In these 
examples, the parent(s) may feel better equipped and prepared to cope and 
support their children through any incumbent challenges, in contrast to the 
appellants’ parents who were concerned that only sperm from a ‘Caucasian’ donor 
would be used in the mother’s IVF treatment.  
 
[30] As such, the distress that these children have experienced is simultaneously 
indicative of the wider ills and prejudices in society and particular to their family 
circumstances. Although race and racism are social constructs, they are 
understood in a way that materially connects to ancestry and inheritance. Racial 
markers such as skin colour have long been conceptualised in terms of ‘blood’ and 
are seen as fairly rigidly determined by nuclear DNA. Yet the ‘genetics’ of race are 
clearly socially constructed, for although these children are mixed-race, they will be 
regarded in society as non-White and potentially also as ‘not from’ Northern 
Ireland. In seeking to ensure that only sperm from a racially matched donor was 
used, the appellants’ parents were trying to ensure that their family would ‘pass’ in 
society as genetically related. Of this, they must surely have been conscious given 
the widespread stigma that is attached to male-factor infertility. At the time of the 
mother’s IVF treatment donor anonymity was a cultural and clinical norm and 
fertility treatment was not as routine and familiar as it may seem today. Secrecy 
around the use of donated gametes was – and still is – common. I do not know if 
the appellants’ parents were also conscious of trying to pass on racial privilege to 
their children. The thought they were may make many of us feel uncomfortable; 
yet our discomfort seems misplaced given the regulatory framework within which 
they indicated their preference and as against the backdrop of racial privilege being 
passed on every day in human reproduction. Likewise, to criticise these parents for 
wanting to ‘pass’ as a genetically related family when so many other families are 
afforded less or no cultural legitimacy or legal recognition, seems to attack a 
symptom rather than a cause of the privileging of certain types of family structure 
in society. It seems therefore right to have sympathy with this family’s 
predicament, while at the same time being attentive to the broader political 
structures which inform our sympathy. The material consequences of oppressive 
hierarchies in society are not as easy to escape as some might like to believe. 
 
[31] On one level, because the distress suffered by the appellant children is both 
general and particular to their family situation, it is reasonable to conclude that 
their distress has been caused by the respondent; for if they had not been careless, 
the children would not be suffering as they are (the ‘but for’ test of causation: 
Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital [1968] 1 All ER 193 (HL)). To experience 
derogatory abuse because of the colour of their skin and the assumed lack of 
relatedness to their parents and each other is also a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of the respondent’s carelessness (Wagon Mound (No 1) [1961] 1 All 
ER 404 (PC)). A legal wrong has therefore been done against the appellant 
children and it would seem just for our system of civil liability to hold the 
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respondent accountable for their carelessness. However, three factors prevent me 
from making this finding. 
 
[32] First, the issue of causation is not as straightforward as indicated above. While 
it is clear that the respondent’s carelessness caused the children to be born with 
the skin colour they have, their distress is simultaneously caused by the wider 
prejudices and structures of society. So while I have no doubt that the children’s 
situation causes them difficulty and emotional distress – along with their parents – 
it seems neither appropriate nor proportionate to hold the respondent trust 
entirely liable for the consequences of societal inequality. 
 
[33] Second, I find that it would be contrary to public policy to require the 
respondent to compensate the appellants for the emotional distress they have 
experienced, for to do so risks individualising the responsibility of dealing with 
racism and other inequalities in society. Compensation through our civil liability 
system is heavily individualised, given that it rests on individual litigants identifying 
fault against defendants. It redistributes the costs associated with injury – whether 
caused intentionally or by omission –amongst a limited pool of persons. Other 
systems are possible, but the current system is what the courts must operate under, 
and such does not countenance compensation for the general effects of structural 
inequalities. While similar arguments can clearly be made in terms of 
compensating claimants for disabilities, we can point more directly to the costs of 
medical and other care, treatment and equipment that a person with disabilities 
may require, whether to survive on a day to day basis, or to partake generally in 
societal activities or earn a living. Nor should anything in this judgment be taken 
to indicate that there isn’t a need for society to become more accommodating of 
disability. However, while a person’s skin colour is a physical characteristic, there 
is nothing physically determinative of a non-White person having higher living 
costs, or experiencing discrimination or racist violence. Instead, such happens 
because of societal prejudice and in my view courts should be wary of signalling 
individual defendants such as fertility clinics, rather than our public authorities, as 
primarily responsible for ameliorating the harms caused by inequality and 
prejudice. These issues must be addressed by our public institutions and measures 
put in place to address the very real, often saturating effects of racism, sexism, 
class prejudice, homophobia and the myriad of other intersecting inequalities that 
make some lives more difficult than others.  
 
[34] In making this policy determination I have sought to resist the familiar 
reasoning that this is what “right thinking people” or the “common man on the 
Clapham omnibus” might think fair or reasonable, for I doubt either would want 
to find themselves in this family’s predicament or walk in the appellant children’s 
shoes. Instead, my decision is based on where I think the responsibility for making 
the appellant children’s lives more bearable. 
 
[35] Finally, I think the appellants’ claim for damages must fail because emotional 
distress is not actionable damage, however upsetting and real this distress may be. 
Negligence claims tend to derive from actionable loss – such as physical or 
psychiatric injury – rather than loss of preference, which results in difficult or 
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upsetting circumstances for the person or persons affected. This court has already 
made clear how the respondent’s frustration of the appellants’ parents’ gamete 
donor preference was a relational obligation to the appellants. However, while 
claimants can now recover for pure psychiatric injury – as opposed to psychiatric 
harm only being recoverable if accompanied by physical injury – the claimant must 
suffer from a recognised psychiatric injury, of which emotional distress or upset, 
as well as fear and grief, does not qualify: Grieves v FT Everard & Sons [2007] 
UKHL 39; White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 1 All ER 1. No 
evidence has been presented to indicate that the appellant children are suffering 
from a recognised psychiatric illness, however distressed they may feel at the abuse 
that has been directed towards them and their family. I have also heard no 
arguments from counsel to advance the proposition that the appellants’ emotional 
distress should constitute legally recognisable harm in the context of this novel 
scenario. This will be because such is very difficult, for even in those jurisdictions 
which permit claims for negligently inflicted emotional distress, some criteria or 
restriction other than reasonable foreseeability of the damage must also be 
satisfied, such as the distress being directly associated with: 1) a physical injury 
negligently inflicted on the victim; 2) defamation of the victim; or 3) witnessing an 
injury caused to others.  
 
[36] Even if the appellant children were suffering from recognised psychiatric 
illness – and we should not rule out the possibility that they may go on to suffer 
from psychiatric illness because of their distress – their claim would still be 
difficult to make out given the “patchwork quilt of distinctions” that is the law on 
the recovery for pure psychiatric harm (per Lord Steyn in White, at 500). For 
example, the conventional starting point of a claimant having to categorise 
themselves as a primary or secondary victim is nonsensical for the appellants in 
this case, for they would have to argue that they are primary victims who are 
suffering psychiatric injury because their skin colour is a physical injury (Alcock v 
Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 4 All ER 907 (HL)). It would be 
erroneous and problematic for any court to determine that to be born a particular 
race constitutes physical injury, as this would distract from the reality that racist 
abuse is levied on the basis of socially constructed difference; however material in 
its affect. To Gillen J’s perceptive comment that claims for personal injuries, loss 
or damage do not fit easily into situations which relate to human reproduction 
[19], I would add that neither do claims for emotional distress or psychiatric injury 
(see also: Law Commission (1998) Report on Liability for Psychiatric Illness).  
 
[37] For these three reasons, the appellants’ claim that they have suffered legally 
compensable loss or damage connected to the respondent’s breach must fail. The 
final issue for the court to consider is whether the appellants may be entitled to 
what has become known as a conventional award. 
 
CONVENTIONAL AWARD 
 
[38] Gillen J rejected the appellants’ counsel’s argument that the children should 
be awarded a conventional award in recognition of the legal wrong done by the 
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fertility clinic, in accordance with the conventional award given to Katrina Rees in 
Rees, as well as a series of other modern negligence cases such as Chester v Afshar 
[2004] UKHL 41 and Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22. 
Counsel argued that this litany of cases represents a modern legal policy that 
where a wrong has been done a remedy will be provided. Gillen J was of the 
opinion that while there was merit in the argument that the appellants’ parents had 
had a legitimate expectation frustrated by the respondent’s carelessness, no such 
argument could extend to the children [33-34]. As indicated above, this court has 
found that the children were owed a duty of care by the respondent and that this 
duty included respecting their parents’ gamete donor preference, given the 
relational impact of this preference on the entire family and the regulatory 
strictures in which their decision was made and supported by the respondent. The 
appellants therefore had a legitimate expectation that their mother’s IVF treatment 
should have proceeded in accordance with the wishes of their parents. I therefore 
disagree with Gillen J that the children cannot be entitled to a conventional award. 
 
[39] While there is much merit in the argument that conventional awards are a less 
than satisfactory means of compensating claimants whose action would otherwise 
have succeeded had it not been for policy departures to the usual principles of 
recovery (Nicolette Priaulx (2005) ‘Damages for the "unwanted" child: time for a 
rethink?’ Medico-Legal Journal 73(4), pp 152-163), the development of conventional 
awards does provide a route into compensating claimants for a loss of preference 
or autonomy when the conventional categorisations of damage – as deriving from 
actionable loss – simply do not countenance a novel case, but where some 
compensation seems just. So while counsel should be wary of shying away from 
challenging and creative legal arguments – for the development of the common 
law relies on such – and short circuiting to arguments for a conventional award for 
their clients in an effort to secure ‘at least’ some compensation, there is scope for a 
conventional award to recognise an interference of personal rights and autonomy 
that are not otherwise contemplated by conventional doctrine. Due to the 
carelessness of the respondent, the appellant children have, and will continue to 
face difficulty. While the cause of that difficulty is wider than the respondent’s 
negligence, it is clear that they would not be suffering had the fertility clinic not 
been careless. A modest conventional award of the amount permitted in Rees 
(£15,000) goes some way to acknowledging that wrong and the court, as a public 
institution, encouraging accountability for substandard treatment which relates to 
the expectations that legally regulated fertility clinics generate. The children and 
their parents may well incur costs in accessing counselling or support networks to 
help them with their distress. While other legal avenues for redress will be open to 
the appellant children should they find themselves victims of discrimination or a 
racially motivated hate crime, such are far from perfect and will once again require 
individual litigation. It seems fair, just and reasonable that the respondent should 
in some way contribute to these potential burdens by providing the appellants 
with a modest, but life changing amount of compensation. 
 
[40] The court orders that the appellants are each entitled to a conventional award 
payment of £15,000 from the respondent. 
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PRIVACY ARGUMENT 
 
[41] I was surprised not to hear any argument from counsel pertaining to the 
privacy interests of the children under Article 8 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights, given that the actions of the respondent Trust have clearly 
impacted on the privacy of this family unit. Such may have been a valuable line of 
argumentation. 
 
